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I. Introduction 
 
The global Covid-19 pandemic arrived at a time of pre-existing and overlapping 
constitutional crises in the European Union, and exacerbated them. Two are the particular 
subjects of this contribution. First, several Member States had been sliding into 
authoritarianism long before the pandemic hit.1 - 2 in Hungary in 
it. Covid-19 has made this crisis worse, as Hungary has responded with a law suspending 
its Constitution and allowing the government to rule by decree, while the EU has continued 
foundational values, amongst which are democracy and the rule of law.3  
 
4 Member States over fiscal discipline 
and economic solidarity have remained unresolved since the last Eurozone crisis. The 
debtor and creditor states of Europe, and raised complex legal and political questions as 
to how the Union could and should assist Member States in financial distress. These 
questions have now resurfaced in the context of Covid-19, with ill-tempered arguments 
between the so-  the Netherlands, and Sweden) and 
hard-hit states such as Italy and Spain as to how the Union should respond to the pandemic 
in monetary, financial, and economic terms. 
 
Just as the pandemic (or at least its first wave) looked to have peaked in Europe, the 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfG) delivered a 
significant judgment5 that ties these two threads together. The BVerfG found in Weiss that 
the European Central Bank (ECB) had exceeded its authority by embarking, since 2015, 
1 See, generally, Wojciech Sadurski, al Breakdown (OUP 2019); András L Pap, 
Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy (Routledge 2018); Nor is such 
backsliding confined to Central Europe, as demonstrated by the recent electoral success of the far-right in 
France and Italy. 
2 - Boston Review, 1 June 2000) 
<https://bostonreview.net/world/g-m-tamas-post-fascism>. This is a term I altogether prefer to the more 
himself. 
3 Art 2 TEU. 
4 This is itself a problematic binary, with undercurrents of stereotyping and sectarianism. For an example of 
such -
Elsevier Weekblad (Amsterdam, 28 May 2020) 
<www.elsevierweekblad.nl/economie/achtergrond/2020/05/geen-stuiver-extra-naar-zuid-europa-
207225w/  
5 German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the Second Senate of 5 May 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, 2 
BvR 980/16, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, available in English at 
<www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.pdf
?__blob=publicationFile&v=5>. In this paper, the judgment is referred to as Weiss, or Weiss (BVerfG) 
where necessary to distinguish 
referred to as Weiss (CJEU). 
on a programme of purchasing Member State assets in an attempt to tackle low inflation 
rates; and that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had not properly 
Weiss goes against 
national law including national constitutional law in cases of conflict between them in 
itutions 
institutional crises, outlined above. First, critics allege I think wrongly that the judgment 
provides cover for democratic backsliding in Member States such as Hungary and Poland: 
Member States do the same? Secondly, it calls into question the legal and political viability 
of attempts by the Union and in particular by the ECB to provide assistance to states 
badly economically hit by the pandemic. In this way, Covid-19 has provided yet more 
evidence of the unsuitability and unsustainability of the current legal, institutional, and 
constitutional architecture of the Eurozone. 
 
This contribution therefore seeks to place the Covid-19 crisis in the context of a Union well-
used to crisis, and already dealing with at least two when the pandemic hit. Will the Union 
muddle through as it has historically done, or do the structural tensions at work mean that 
in particular the cowardly European response, is here portrayed as a significant threat to 
democracy and the rule of law throughout the Union. Next, it deals with the effect of the 
ultra vires.6 The judgment would have been a bombshell at the best of times, but its arrival 
during the pandemic threw things into even sharper relief: if the PSPP was ultra vires, there 
questions about the ability of the Union 
and its Member States to mitigate the economic chaos wrought by the pandemic. The 
judgment is in many respects theoretically coherent and compelling (which is why those 
who accuse the BVerfG of giving succour to autocrats are mistaken), but its worrying 
political background raises serious questions about the ability of the Union to provide and 
co-ordinate the kind of action needed to stave off or alleviate post-Covid economic crisis.  
Finally, a way forward is sketched, involving the Union finally having the honesty properly 
to grapple with the inherent structural flaws of the Union in general, and the Eurozone in 
particular. In short, the Treaties7 must be amended, and it should not have taken a deadly 
pandemic to prove it. 
 
II. On the Hungarian Enabling Act and the Democratic Crisis in the Union 
 
The Hungarian Fundamental Law of 20118 regularly contemplates its own negation: 
Articles 48
const
6 Or, more accurately but less directly, holding the  ultra 
vires. 
7 Two treaties form the legal and constitutional basis of the EU: the Treaty on European Union (TEU, 
originally the Treaty of Maastricht) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 
originally the Treaty of Rome). 
8 A document of highly questionable democratic credentials: see Gábor Attila Tóth (ed), Constitution for a 
 (CEU Press 2012). 
-9 
party initially channelled its legal response to the Covid-19 pandemic. However, chafing 
-day limit on 
the end of March Orbán used his two-thirds parliamentary majority to pass what we can 
rightly call an Enabling Act,10 allowing him to rule by decree for an indefinite period. Others 
have written cogently of the Act a 11 of how it fits perfectly with 
-established patterns of behaviour;12 and of the dim prospects of EU law being 
any use against it, at least in the short- to medium-term.13 What is important for present 
foolishness of the European response.  
 
On 31 March, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen tweeted that: 
 
fundamental principles and values. Democracy cannot work without free and independent 
media. Respect of freedom of expression and legal certainty are essential in these 
uncertain times.14 
 
She added that the Commission: 
 
will closely monitor, in a spirit of cooperation, the application of emergency measures in all 
Member States. We all need to wor
uphold our European values & human rights. This is who we are & what we stand for.15 
 
Such dishwater platitudes are to be expected from a President who owes her position to 
the votes of MEPs from -related ruling PiS16 party, 
and who thought it a clever idea to try to appoint a Commissioner for 
17 a post later made no less nonsensical and insulting by being 
changed to one of  
 
 
9 Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége
movement in the late 1980s, the party has shifted dramatically to the right. 
10 Krista Verfassungsblog, 6 
April 2020, <https://verfassungsblog.de/hungarys-orbanistan-a-complete-arsenal-of-emergency-powers/>. 
11 Verfassungsblog, 24 March 2020, 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/pandemic-as-constitutional-moment/>. 
12 Verfassungblog, 29 March 2020, 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/orbans-emergency/>. 
13  Became an Aggravation of the Rule of Law Crisis in the 
DCU Brexit Institute Blog, 2 April 2020, <http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2020/04/how-a-
public-health-crisis-became-an-aggravation-of-the-rule-of-law-crisis-in-the-european-union/>. 
14 Ursula von der Leyen, Twitter, 31 March 2020,  
<https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1244960501085491202?s=20>.  
15 Ursula von der Leyen, Twitter, 31 March 2020, 
<https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1244960502385688576?s=20>.  
16   
17 
DCU Brexit Institute Blog, 19 September 2019, <http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2019/09/undermining-
our-european-way-of-life-the-von-der-leyen-commission-takes-the-low-road/>. 
rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights arising from the adoption of certain 
18 
 
A striking aspect of both these responses was their unwillingness their seeming 
inability to name 
resisted and challenged. The consequences of this diplomatic squeamishness soon 
became clear: just a day later, on 2 April, in an act of the purest, most distilled chutzpah, 
the Hungarian government had the gall to join in adopting the statement issued by the 
19 Whatever his other flaws, we can credit Viktor 
Orbán with being a master of comic timing.  
 
Subsequently, the decrees came in thick and fast.20 
be legally altered. Municipal theatres rare islands of intellectual independence and the 
possibility of artistic and political dissent will be brought under central government 
control. Quite what these measures have to do with stopping the spread of the coronavirus 
and managing the crisis is not clear. What is clear is the Enabling Act is mere opportunism, 
seizing on a deadly threat to permit the government to go about its agenda with the very 
minimum of political, legal, and press scrutiny. 
 
 actually 
name offenders, and if the offenders are actually capable of feeling shame. The refusal of 
the Commission and the Member States to name Hungary and to specifically condemn 
a kind of comity of idiots, where each is afraid of being undiplomatic to the other, just in 
case the other might one day be undiplomatic to them.  
 
age, a time when we really could draw 
21 The Enabling Act adopted in 
response to the Covid-19 crisis does not just endanger Hungary and Hungarians, but 
Europe and Europeans: the rot can spread from the Member States to the Union, from the 
the Hungarian body politic;  Daphne 
18 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Spa 1 April 2020, <https://www.government.nl/documents/diplomatic-
statements/2020/04/01/statement-by-belgium-denmark-finland-france-germany-greece-ireland-italy-
luxembourg-the-netherlands-portugal-spain-sweden>. 
19 Gover https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-
justice/news/statement-of-hungary-02042020>. 
20 Hungarian Spectrum, 1 April 2020, 
<https://hungarianspectrum.org/2020/04/01/decrees-that-have-nothing-to-do-with-the-coronavirus-
pandemic/>. 
21  Constitutionalism: Some Consequences of Constitutional Pluralism for Domestic 
Handbook on Legal Pluralism in the EU 
(Edward Elgar 2018). 
Caruana Galizia in Malta22 and Ján Kuciak in Slovakia23 are not directly related, but taken 
together they are all indicative of a Union sliding ever further into the mire, where 
the appearance of unity is more important than any actual substantive commonality of 
democratic standards, or those belov  
 
There has recently been at least some movement in terms of legal sanction for Orbán and 
those like him. In March, Advocate-General Kokott advised24 
versity was hounded out of Budapest, in breach 
of EU and WTO law. In April, the CJEU held that Poland, Hungary, and Czechia had failed 
distribution of asylum-seekers across the Union.25 But these victories are partial, reactive, 
and belated, and have met with scorn from Fidesz.26 Union law in general, and the EU 
Treaties in particular, are simply not geared towards the rectification of the kind of 
authoritarian opportunism of which Orbán is the standard-bearer. 
 
In the present state of Union law, the solution must be, and can only be, political. The 
Hungarian Enabling Act exposes the idea that European conservatives can curb the 
excesses of their most obviously authoritarian bedfellows as the delusion it has always 
been. Nor are the EPP alone in sheltering undesirables: the Social Democrats and the 
Liberals are both happy to rely on the votes of members with questionable records and 
intentions.27 Remedying the authoritarian drift in the Union requires concerted political 
action, both within and between Member States. 
 
The Hungarian reaction to the Covid-19 crisis and the European response exposes the 
it does, and what it is meant to be. From 
bailouts to borders to non-
the EU can exist as a kind of rarefied space of apolitical technocracy. In this sense, we 
can learn a valuable lesson from Orbán: opportunities ought not be wasted. 
 
It is to another instance of Covid-19 revealing politicians hiding behind technocracy, rather 
than engaging in difficult negotiations and attempting to gain electoral approval for the 
results, that we now turn. 
 
 
 
 
22 Jean aise of Malta: Social Divisions, Weak Institutions, 
March 2018, available at <www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2018/20180328%20-
%20Conference%20Paper.pdf>. 
23 
Research 83. 
24 Case C 66/18 Commission v Hungary  
25 Joined Cases C 715/17, C 718/17 and C 719/17 Commission v Poland and Others 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:257. 
26 
. It must be lonesome in the saddle since 
<https://twitter.com/JuditVarga_EU/status/1245653581262286848?s=20>. 
27 oups Also Ditch 
Euractiv, 12 March 2019, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/opinion/epp-more-
likely-to-expel-fidesz-if-rival-groups-also-ditch-troublemakers/>. 
Weiss 
 
In March 2015, the ECB launched the Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme (PSPP),28 
under which it would purchase government and other public bonds of Eurozone Member 
States under certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, in an attempt to get 
inflation rates then very low
Five years later, on 18 March 2020, the ECB announced a Pandemic Emergency Purchase 
50bn would be spent on purchasing public sector 
securities to shore up European economies during the Covid-19 pandemic.29 The ECB 
restrictions and conditions in order to enhance its effectiveness. The ECB must have been 
confident that it had the legal power to launch the PEPP: after all, the CJEU had held in 
2018 that the PSPP complied with EU law, and was within the powers of the ECB.30 
However, just a few weeks after the launch of the PEPP, the BVerfG handed down its 
judgment in Weiss
or something close 
to one at the best of times. However, coming as it did while the pandemic raged across 
Europe, it raised serious questions not only about the ability of the EU to respond to the 
pandemic in monetary, financial, and economic terms, but about the very makeup and 
architecture of the Union in general and the Eurozone in particular: questions of long 
standing, surely, but ones thrown into new relief by the urgency and seriousness of the 
pandemic. 
 
The question of the legality of the PSPP arose in 2017, when the programme was subject 
to a constitutional challenge in Germany. The applicants argued that the PSPP 
States,31 and the principle of conferral32 (under which the Union is not a body of unlimited 
competence, but has only the competences specifically bestowed upon it by the Member 
States in the Treaties). As such, the German state and its institutions would be prohibited 
from taking part in the PSPP, it being an illegal exercise of power by the Union. Under EU 
law, if any national court from which there is no appeal finds that the legality of an action 
of a Union institution is called into question in a case before it, the national court must refer 
the question the CJEU for decision. Only the CJEU is competent, under the Treaties, to 
determine whether a Union institution has acted illegally.33 This being such a case, the 
BVerfG referred the issue to the CJEU. 
 
28 Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public 
sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/10), as amended by Decision (EU) 2015/2101 of 5 
November 2015 (ECB/2015/33), Decision (EU) 2015/2464 of 16 December 2015 (ECB/2015/48), Decision 
(EU) 2016/702 of 18 April 2016 (ECB/2016/8), Decision (EU) 2016/1041 of 22 June 2016 on the eligibility 
of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic and repealing Decision 
(EU) 2015/300 (ECB/2016/18), and Decision (EU) 2017/ 100 of 11 January 2017 (ECB/2017/1). 
29 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html>. 
30 Case C 493/17 Weiss and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:815 (hereinafter Weiss (CJEU)). 
31 Art 123 (1) TEU. 
32 Art 5 (1) TEU, read in conjunction with Arts 119 and 127 133 TFEU. 
33 Art 267 TFEU, known as the preliminary ruling procedure. 
In December 2018, the CJEU delivered its judgment,34 holding that the PSPP is within the 
competences of the Union. This was perhaps to be expected: the CJEU is famous for the 
expansive approach it takes to determining Union competence. The Court held that the 
PSPP does not involve the ECB straying from the realm of monetary policy (which is an 
exclusive Union competence for those Member States in the Eurozone35) to that of 
economic policy (which is an area primarily for the Member States, in which the ECB has 
only a supporting role36). The CJEU held that in dividing competences between the Union 
and t
37 Here is the root of the 
problem: though the separation may not be absolute, it is clear: monetary policy is for the 
Union, economic policy is mainly for the Member States. However, such a division is plainly 
impossible, monetary and economic policy being so utterly intertwined and inextricable.38 
The presence of such an unworkable distinction at the very heart o
constitution is the result of political cowardice by those who wanted a shared currency but 
not a shared budget and shared liabilities
eating it. 
 
judgment ought to have been the end of the matter: the BVerfG, as a court of a Member 
State and thus as a court of the Union, would have to accept this decision loyally, and 
dismiss the complaints in the domestic proceedings.  
 
Constitutional and Supreme courts of numerous Member States, including Germany. In a 
long line of case law, the BVerfG has held that as the Union is a body of limited 
competences, and as the CJEU is a Union institution, both the Union as a whole and the 
CJEU in particular lack Kompetenz-Kompetenz: the ability to determine the limits of their 
own powers.39 It cannot be left to the Union and its institutions to mark their own homework, 
and there remains a role, even if only a residual one, for the Member States and their 
courts to determine in a given case whether the Union has overstepped the bounds of the 
authority granted it in the Treaties.   
 
Weiss came 
as the pandemic was at its peak in Europe, but the coincidence is a revealing one, and 
illustrates the precarity of the constitutional and institutional architecture of the Eurozone. 
The single currency may well be able to plod along when times are good, but as soon as 
things go bad (as they have now done twice, and very suddenly, first with the onset of the 
Eurozone crisis and then with the pandemic), the inability of the Union to react to events 
with the necessary speed and firepower is revealed. 
 
For the BVerfG, the ECB had acted ultra vires by embarking on the PSPP without having 
conducted a proportionality review, in order to determine whether the programme was 
34 Weiss (CJEU) (n 30). 
35 Art 3 (1) (c) TEU. 
36 Art 127 (1) TFEU. 
37 Weiss (CJEU) (n 30) [60]. 
38 
Social Europe, 8 June 2020, <https://www.socialeurope.eu/enlarging-the-ecb-
mandate-for-the-common-good-and-the-planet>. 
39 See Tom Flynn, The Triangular Constitution: Constitutional Pluralism in Ireland, the EU, and the ECHR 
(Hart 2019) 2 4. 
competence, and whether a different programme, with fewer effects on economic and 
fiscal policy, could achieve the same monetary aims.40 More than this, the failure (as the 
BVerfG sees it) of the CJEU properly to conduct such a proportionality review in the 
41 42 Accordingly, on 
conception of the relationship between EU law and German law (which, let us remember, 
Therefore, the BVerfG, in the absence of effective judicial control of a Union institution by 
the CJEU, declared the PSPP ultra vires. The Bundesbank was ordered not to take part in 
the programme, though the BVerfG stayed this last order for three months, in order to give 
the ECB time to conduct the proportionality review it had failed to engage in. It is possible 
that, if it (or, more likely, the Bundesbank on its behalf) does so to the satisfaction of the 
BVerfG, the German court will revisit its verdict. 
 
This was a momentous decision. In term of its theoretical fundamentals, though not the 
43 of EU law, and of the CJEU as its interpreter, 
for which some scholars advocate44 has no basis in the Treaties or in constitutional theory, 
and fails to respect both the specific nature of the Union as a sui generis non-state legal 
order and the constitutions of the Member States. The more contingent, relational 
conception of the school of thought known as constitutional pluralism, where the Member 
States and the Union inhabit a legal heterarchy rather than a hierarchy,45 is both more 
descriptively accurate and more normatively desirable. 
 
However, though grounded in the best interpretation of the relationship between EU law 
and that of the Member States, the judgment should still give us pause in other respects: 
the case was brought by an array of academics, industrialists, and politicians with close 
links to right-
party, the CSU, but also the crypto-(and sometimes not very crypto-)fascist Alternative für 
Deutschland unsavoury logic whereby the 
Union in general, and the Euro in particular, are a kind of German charity project, whereby 
ride. Widespread across the German right, this worldview bears no relation to economic 
or social reality, and fails to acknowledge that the current setup of the Eurozone and the 
internal market is one from which Germany profits nicely. 
 
Of course, politically distasteful applicants can still have a good legal case, as was the 
case here. The trouble is that in several passages, the BVerfG repeats ordoliberal 
40 
architects: that such aims are in fact severable. 
41 Weiss (BVerfG) (n 5) [127]. 
42 Ibid [133]. 
43 erga omnes hierarchy between norms or institutions within a single, 
in casu preference given to one norm or 
institution over another in the context of interacting but distinct systems or orders: see Matej Avbelj, 
 
44 
Research Handbook on Legal Pluralism and EU Law (Elgar 2018) 403. 
45 See generally Flynn (n 39) and references therein. 
bromides about the risk of the PSPP reducing the in
States46 47 
were an objective standard capable of guiding legal action, rather than an entirely 
contingent concept, which varies according to the particular politics and economic 
approach of the person doing the sums. 
 
ruffled feathers in any circumstances. However, its publication during the pandemic has 
had two consequences. 
 
First, it has consequences to the rule of law crisis discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter: it has been used by those who criticise constitutional pluralism and argue for the 
untrammelled hierarchical superiority of EU law as further evidence that whatever its 
theoretical rigour, and regardless of the good intentions behind those who developed it, 
constitutional pluralism is now a useful tool of autocrats, whereby they can justify their 
deviation from European norms of democracy, rights, and the rule of law.48 After all, if the 
BVerfG (or the Italian Corte Costituzionale49 or the Danish Højesteret50) can contradict the 
CJEU, then any national court can, and there is nothing to stop Hungary or Poland from 
simply declaring ultra vires any CJEU judgment with which they disagree. The problem 
with this objection is that it regards all national courts and all questioning of CJEU 
orthodoxy as being essentially the same. Neither is the case. The German, Italian, and 
Danish courts, whatever one may think of their decisions, are legitimate, independent 
judicial bodies operating in functioning Rechstaaten. The same is absolutely not true of, 
say, the Hungarian Kúria or the post-
by the executive does not discredit that jurisprudence. Besides, one may agree or disagree 
with the reasoning of the German, Italian, or Danish courts, but the reasoning is at least 
defensible: this is in contrast to some of the CJEU verdicts which have triggered Member 
State rejection, and similarly in contrast to the abusive jurisprudence and threadbare 
reasoning of, for example, the Kúria.51 
 
Secondly, the BVerfG judgment raises significant questions about the viability of the PEPP, 
 us be honest) 
response to the pandemic. It is true that a programme such as the PEPP may satisfy the 
CJEU,52 but it is also true that it does not take much to satisfy the CJEU where the question 
of the Union acting within its competences is concerned. The PEPP being subject to even 
fewer and looser safeguards, conditions, and restrictions than the PSPP, it cannot satisfy 
46 Weiss (BVerfG) (n 5) [137]. 
47 Ibid [171]. 
48 
Verfassungsblog, 26 May 2020, <verfassungsblog.de/national-courts-
cannot-override-cjeu-judgments/>. 
49 Taricco II
https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S_2018_115_EN.pdf). 
50 Case 15/2014 of 6 Dec 2016, Dansk Industri (Ajos), available in English at 
http://www.supremecourt.dk/supremecourt/nyheder/pressemeddelelser/Documents/Judgment%2015-
2014.pdf. 
51 Hungarian Constitutional Court Decision 22/2016, available in English at 
<https://hunconcourt.hu/uploads/sites/3/2017/11/en_22_2016.pdf>. 
52 ors 
Institute Policy Brief (draft), March 2020, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3558677>. 
the BVerfG in the light of its decision regarding the PSPP. This does not mean that the 
PEPP, or something like it, is impossible, but it does mean that the ECB will need to take 
a rather different approach if it is to satisfy the BVerfG that it is acting within the terms of 
its mandate and not infringing on areas rightly or wrongly (I think wrongly) hived off from 
Union competence. One might say that as a Union institution, subject only to the CJEU, 
the ECB should simply not concern itself with what the BVerfG has to say, and on the 
be right. However, the reality of European integration is more complex, and, one way or 
another, the contradiction will have to be resolved. 
 
IV. The Way Forward 
 
The Covid-19 crisis, aside from its own terrible toll, has exposed pre-existing tensions in 
the EU like never before.  
 
pursue its agenda with the barest minimum of scrutiny, and the response from the Union 
and the other Member States is exactly the kind of dispiriting shrug to which we have 
become accustomed. 
 
It coincided with a German court judgment of Union-wide importance, which brings to the 
very fore political, legal, and economic tensions within the Union a judgment which came 
at perhaps the most inopportune time possible, just as the ECB was embarking on another 
round of asset purchases in an attempt to assist the Member States, particularly those 
doubly affected both by the Eurozone crisis and by the pandemic. 
 
The solution, in both instances, should not perhaps cannot be legal (or, rather, judicial). 
It must be political.  
 
As regards the rule of law crisis, the non-authoritarian Member States must finally live up 
to their responsibilities, and stop pretending that the abuse of democracy and 
extent, but cannot be limited to this alone: heavy political pressure must be brought to bear. 
 
fantasy visions of political economy must recognise two contradictory truths. It is true that 
the PEPP, like the PSPP before it, is an important and necessary step (but only a step) in 
correcting the foundational and fundamental flaw in the Eurozone: that is a monetary union, 
but not a fiscal one. It is also true that the PEPP is arguably illegal under the Treaties as 
they currently stand. On this question, the CJEU is simply wrong, and the BVerfG is right, 
no matter how much we may disagree with those who took the case, or with the German 
-economic assumptions. The only way to deal with this 
contradiction and reconcile these two truths with legal integrity and intellectual honesty is 
by Treaty amendment. This does not have to mean full-scale economic or fiscal integration. 
But it does mean some undoing of the unworkably bright line drawn between monetary 
policy on the one hand and fiscal and economic policy on the other. The Franco-German 
53
announced not long after the BVerfG judgment, but not in response to it is a very small 
step in the right direction, but further demonstrates the limits of what can be achieved 
within the framework of the Treaties as they currently stand. 
 
Both of these solutions require the Member States to stop cowering behind the CJEU (in 
the context of democratic values and the rule of law) and the ECB (in the monetary and 
Member States, each with their own treaty ratification procedures and particular national 
sensitivities, no doubt this will be difficult. That is not an excuse not to try: Covid-19 has 
shown us that crises will not wait for us to get our act together. 
 
  
53 franco-
Presidency, 18 May 2020, <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/05/18/initiative-franco-
allemande-pour-la-relance-europeenne-face-a-la-crise-du-coronavirus -französische Initiative 
zur wirtschaftlichen Erholung Europas nach der Coro
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/deutsch-franzoesische-initiative-zur-wirtschaftlichen-
erholung-europas-nach-der-coronakrise-1753760>. 
